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Abstract 
The European economic governance reform of 2011 (the so-
called six pack) has placed a greater emphasis on macroeconomic 
surveillance, through the introduction of mechanisms that are 
both preventative and corrective, adopted from the procedures 
which have already been applied for public finance with the PSC. 
In fact, following the financial crisis of 2008, the link between 
public finances and the complex economic situation was 
highlighted.  
In this perspective, the Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure also includes the possibility that some Member States 
with excessive macroeconomic imbalances are subjected to an in-
depth review (In Depth Review - IDR) aimed at implementing the 
re-entry measures recommended by the Council.  
With regard to Italy, the final Report of the Commission 
within the MIP framework indicates, besides the high level of debt 
and low competitiveness, some elements of weakness which 
undermine the path to rehabilitation and development of the 
country. 
The study aims to retrace the main observations which the 
European Commission has expressed in the Report of November 
2014 in order to consider which reforms have been carried out and 
what is the gap between the re-entry path recommended by the 
European institution and the actions of the Italian government. 
The analysis of the Italian case emphasises that the 
economic evaluations of European institutions are necessarily 
conditioned by the national and European political context. In fact, 
the credibility of the first conditions the granting of greater 
flexibility in the application of the rules. Simultaneously, an 
analogous conditioning derives from political interactions 
between the rigorous front and its opponents. 
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1. Introduction 
The difficulties encountered in the imposition of a unitary 
guide of financial measures for Member States have led to the 
expansion and deepening of the multilateral surveillance until, 
where necessary, the direction and the taking of economic policy 
decisions are reached, pursuant to Art.121Tfue, on the basis of 
which, the economic policies of Member States represent a “matter 
of common interest”. 
In this context, the so-called six pack introduced the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances procedure (MIP), aimed at the 
prevention and the correction of macroeconomic imbalances (see 
governance dossier). 
Through MIP, the Commission has recently identified 9 
States of the European Monetary Union which have excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances: Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Slovenia and Finland.  
In the case of Italy, similar to Slovenia, the existence of 
excessive imbalances which require enhanced monitoring and the 
adoption of specific re-entry measures were found. 
In particular, the European Commission identified an 
important element of imbalance in the high debt and weak 
competitiveness of the country.  
The article, on the basis of observations made by the 
Commission in the last report of November 2014, aims to 
reconstruct and analyse the address of the financial political 
direction adopted by the government, trying to highlight the link 
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between the method of application of the rules of fiscal co-
ordination and the reliability of policies put in place by the State. 
The objective of this study is to demonstrate that the 
application of the somewhat flexible fiscal discipline depends not 
only on economic assessments but also on assessments of a 
political nature. 
Reliance upon a government’s political direction may 
depend on the activation of infringement procedures, or the 
concession of extra time to reduce imbalances. 
It is, therefore, to set up a kind of directly proportional 
relationship between the margins of sovereignty remaining to the 
State and its government’s ability to pursue its development 
objectives and sound public finance. The margins of fiscal 
sovereignty shrink in proportion to the inability of a State to 
govern its own economy and finances, provoking spill-over effects 
for the community. 
This study begins with the analysis of the Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure (MIP) (section 2 and 3) and moves forward 
to focus its attention on the main weaknesses highlighted by the 
Commission in key sectors of the country. The observations of the 
Commission shall be considered for each sector on the one hand 
while on the other, the actions taken by the Italian government 
(sections 4, 5, 6). 
The analysis will conclude that most of the reforms 
undertaken can only be assessed in the long-term, once their 
effects have been produced. It, therefore, discusses the granting, 
alongside a flexibility for relevant factors, of exceptional events 
and the launching of structural reforms 1 ; even a temporal 
flexibility, consistent with the actual unfolding of reforms (reg. 
EU, no. 1176, art. 8, paragraph 2). 
Compared to the latter type of flexibility, the political 
credibility and the supranational political dynamics of the Italian 
government will prove crucial when faced with an anti-rigorous 
front in the early stages (section 7).  
 
 
 
                                                           
1 See Art. 2, par.1 bis reg.1467/97; 1466/1997, article 2, par. 2; art. 5, par. 1, letter 
c reg. EU no. 1466/1997. 
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2. The Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) 
The reform of European economic governance in 2011 
stressed the importance of macroeconomic surveillance, 
introducing both preventative and corrective mechanisms.  
This helps not only for a deeper surveillance in the cases of 
States facing situations of financial instability, but now is also 
extended to include monitoring and correction of macroeconomic 
imbalances (reg. EU 1174/2011 and 1175/2011). 
The range of macroeconomic surveillance is not limited to 
Eurozone countries, but includes the entire European Union, 
although different levels of co-ordination are provided for within 
the two zones. 
The procedure for macroeconomic imbalances, based on 
Art.121Tfue, paragraph 2, provides for the monitoring of 
economic factors whose values, in the financial crisis of 2008, were 
identified as an early warning of this crisis.  
The alert mechanism of the Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure is based on a series of macroeconomic indicators whose 
value is shown as a “scoreboard” together with the respective 
threshold value beyond which presents a potential imbalance. 
The scoreboard is defined and publicised by the European 
Commission on the basis of Article 4 of (EU) regulation no. 
1176/2011. 
In the Alert Mechanism Report of February 2012, the 
scoreboard consisted of ten indicators covering the entire scope of 
enforcement of macroeconomic surveillance as defined by Article 
4, paragraph 3, of (EU) regulation no. 1176/20112. Although this 
                                                           
2 See (EU) Regulation no. 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16th November, 2011, on the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances, art. 4, 3 “The scoreboard shall, inter alia, 
encompass indicators which are useful in the early identification of: (a) internal 
imbalances, including those that can arise from public and private indebtedness; 
financial and asset market developments, including housing; the evolution of 
private sector credit flow; and the evolution of unemployment; (b) external 
imbalances, including those that can arise from the evolution of current account 
and net investment positions of Member States; real effective exchange rates; 
export market shares; changes in price and cost developments; and non-price 
competitiveness, taking into account the different components of productivity. 
4. In undertaking its economic reading of the scoreboard in the alert mechanism, 
the Commission shall pay close attention to developments in the real economy, 
including economic growth, employment and unemployment performance, 
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first set of indicators represented many financial aspects (e.g. the 
flow of credit to the private sector, public and private sector debt) 
the European Parliament and the Council have supported the 
European Commission’s proposal of adding a further indicator 
intended to show the reciprocal links between the actual economy 
and the financial sector3. 
The procedure is based on an Alert Mechanism which 
identifies, on the basis of the Scoreboard, in which Member States 
there are indications of potential emerging macroeconomic 
imbalances that may require further examination.  
The framework of these indicators, accompanied by an 
economic analysis, is presented in an Annual Report which is 
usually presented in the month of November, the Alert 
Mechanism Report, which sets the starting point of the annual 
cycle of the procedure. The conclusions of the Alert Mechanism 
Report are examined by the Council of the European Union and 
the Eurogroup. The report identifies those Member States which 
are at risk of macroeconomic imbalance and which are expected to 
be subjected to a more detailed analysis (In Depth Review - IDR). 
Simultaneously, as is provided for in the excessive deficit 
procedure, in case serious imbalances are revealed, it is up to the 
Council to declare their existence and recommend that the 
relevant State adopts specific measures within a specified period; 
the Council also verifies whether the Corrective Action Plan 
presented by the State is adequate, in which case it shall adopt a 
recommendation for setting out the actions and deadlines for its 
implementation, as indicated in the Plan. 
                                                                                                                                              
nominal and real convergence inside and outside the euro area, productivity 
developments and its relevant drivers such as research and development and 
foreign and domestic investment, as well as sectorial developments including 
energy, which affect GDP and current account performance. The scoreboard 
shall also include indicative thresholds for the indicators, to serve as alert levels. 
The choice of indicators and thresholds shall be conducive towards promoting 
competitiveness in the Union”. 
3 See, European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, The European Central Bank, the European Economic 
and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European 
Investment Bank on the Alert Mechanism Report 2013, COM (2012) 751 final, 28 
November 2012; European Commission, Scoreboard for the surveillance of 
macroeconomic imbalances, European Economy, Occasional Papers no.92, 
February 2012. 
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Otherwise, if the corrective action planned by the State is 
considered to be insufficient, the Council recommends the 
drafting of a new plan which, if assessed as being inadequate 
again, exposes the relevant State to the imposition of a penalty 
equivalent to 0.1% of GDP. 
The procedure continues with the monitoring of the 
implementation measures contained in the plan and ends with the 
return to imbalances. 
The possibility that the procedure is suspended in cases 
where the imbalance persists is also expected, despite the 
implementation of all the measures in the Corrective Action Plan. 
Conversely, if the State has not followed corrective 
measures, the Council may impose an interest-bearing deposit of 
up to 0.1% of GDP, together with the issuing of recommendations 
of new terms for the adoption of corrective measures; in case of 
continued non-compliance by the State, the deposit changes into a 
fine. 
For the Eurozone, the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
(MIP) constitutes a further strengthening of the co-ordination of 
fiscal policies, complementing and indirectly strengthening the 
financial co-ordination, given that the financial situation of a 
country is the most obvious manifestation, and the result of 
economic policies that are put in place, but without providing a 
complete picture. 
 
 
3. The Commission’s observations relative to Italy’s 
macroeconomic imbalances 
Pursuant to EU Reg. no. 1176/2011, the country-specific 
recommendations, approved by the Council on the basis of the 
European Commission’s assessment on the macroeconomic 
situation and the budget of the country, indicate how to intervene 
in order to overcome macroeconomic imbalances. 
Italy is subject to enhanced monitoring because its 
imbalances were considered to be excessive, equal to what was 
provided for in the case of Slovenia and similarly, to what was 
provided for in the case of France and Spain which have 
macroeconomic imbalances that are not really excessive but 
“serious”. 
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Enhanced monitoring is carried out through a more 
detailed formulation of the Council’s recommendations, indicating 
the reforms to be adopted and the time limits for their 
implementation, and in the preparation of two specific interim 
reports from the Commission.  
In particular, the European Commission presented the third 
Alert Mechanism Report on the 13th November, 2013, on the basis 
of which, those countries which should be subjected to an in-
depth analysis relative to the existence of macroeconomic 4 
imbalances were identified.  
With regard to Italy, the European Commission’s in-depth 
analysis published on the 5th March, 2014, has highlighted the 
risks associated with the high level of public debt and the weak 
external competitiveness, both deriving from low growth in 
productivity. 
Based on the Stability Programme and the National Reform 
Programme presented by Italy in April 2014, the European 
Commission proposed eight specific recommendations to Italy in 
June 2014, subsequently adopted by the Council of the European 
Union.  
At the same time, the European Commission commenced 
the monitoring of progress made by member countries in the 
adoption of the policy measures that can contribute to the 
reduction of imbalances. 
An initial monitoring mission commenced in Italy on the 
days of the 15th – 17th September, 2014, and the results were 
presented in the report published on the 10th November which 
will be updated at the beginning of 2015 on the basis of results of a 
second mission.  
The report was prepared on the basis of the contents of the 
Update to the Economic and Financial Document (DEF) 2014 and 
successive modifications made through the Report to Parliament 
of the end of October 2014. 
The Commission conducts assessments largely attributable 
to three areas: 1) Measures related to public finances and public 
debt sustainability; 2) Measures related to productivity growth 
                                                           
4 See European Commission, Alert Mechanism Report 2014, COM (2013) 790 final, 
13 November 2013.  
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and external competitiveness; 3) Measures related to institutional 
capacity to implement reforms. 
 
 
 4. Measures related to public finances and public debt 
sustainability 
In particular, the observations relative to public finance 
show that the high public debt represents, for various reasons, a 
heavy negative element for the country’s growth and 
development. 
In the first place, a high level of debt necessitates a high 
level of taxation to maintain it; secondly, costs resulting from the 
payment of interest are very high; third, a country with high debt 
is exposed to the volatility of financial markets and, therefore, at 
the risk of re-financing.  
For these reasons, the reduction in the stock of public debt 
is the main priority for Italy. This notwithstanding that, fiscal 
balances, both in nominal and structural terms took a turn for the 
worse in October 2014 with respect to the previous values 
indicated in the Economic and Financial Decisions (DEF) 
presented in April 2014: it is expected that the Deficit/GDP ratio is 
equal to 2.6% and that the Debt/GDP ratio shall reach the 
maximum value in 2015, equal to 133% to then decrease in 2016 
onwards, although at a slower rhythm than envisaged in the 
Stability Programme 2014. 
In this respect, in the recommendations relative to the 
National Reform Programme and the Stability Programme the 
need for a Minimum Linear Structural Adjustment (MLSA) of the 
structural deficit equal to 0.7 percentage points of GDP was 
already highlighted, to achieve the objectives of debt reduction 
after the 2013-20155 transition period; subsequently, in view of the 
worsening economic conditions, in the Update of the Economic 
and Financial Document (DEF), expectations related to the 
                                                           
5 See Commission staff Working Document, Assessment of the 2014 National 
Reform Programme and Stability Programme for Italy, Accompanying the 
document. Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on Italy’s 2014 
National Reform Programme and delivering a Council opinion on Italy’s 2014 
Stability Programme, Brussels, 2.5.2014, Swd (2014) final; available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/swd2014_italy_en.pdf. 
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necessary Minimum Linear Structural Adjustment increased to 0.9 
percentage points of GDP6. 
However, a Minimum Linear Structural Adjustment of 0.9 
percentage points of GDP would lead to a correction of 2.2 
percentage points of GDP to be in line with the forward-looking 
benchmark of 2017 in which the Debit/GDP ratio is set equal to 
126%. 
This would be a very severe correction which the Italian 
government appropriately believes is “neither feasible nor 
desirable” 7, reserving the right to take advantage of the margins 
of flexibility in the current regulations of the Stability Growth Path 
(SGP) on the basis of the relevant factors characterising the current 
Italian financial situation8. 
In particular, the measures announced in the Italian 
Stability Programme and National Reform Programme (NRP), to 
obtain an improvement in the public debt/GDP ratio, were aimed 
toward reviving the economy by accelerating the payments of 
outstanding debt on the part of the public authorities and above 
all, through a privatisation plan which, in the period 2014-2017, 
would bring a cash intake equal to 0.7% of the GDP. 
In the Update to the DEF, forecasts for such a cash intake 
decreased to 0.4% of GDP, due to delays in operations previously 
announced but deferred due to unfavourable market conditions.  
For these reasons, the privatisation of Poste Italiane (up to 
40%) and ENAV (up to 49%) for example, has been postponed and 
could take place in 2015. 
With regard to the extensive privatisation programme 
announced by the Italian government, the European Commission 
observed that other operations which could be implemented in the 
short-term are the sale of the Ministry of Economy and Finance's 
(MEF) stake in the holding STH which controls STMicroelectronics 
and possibly 5% of ENEL shares (out of the 31.24% owned by the 
MEF).  
                                                           
6 See, European Commission, Italy – review of progress on policy measures relevant 
for the correction of macroeconomic imbalances, Brussels, November 2014. 
7 See Minister of Finance, Update to Economic and Financial Document, 2014, 
p.44 and table III.6. 
8 On these issues, please refer to the comments already made in F. Nugnes, 
Italian Government’s Balanced Budget postponement, 1 IJPL (2014). 
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At the same time, the Commission noted that the 
privatisation of the Company’s export credit insurance (SACE) 
and CDP Networks, does not involve a significant amount 
distributed to the MEF in the form of super-dividends because it is 
made up of two companies under indirect control of the state 
through Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP).  
Unlike previous observations, the assessment on “The 
Rationalisation Programme for Local Public Enterprises” 
presented by the Spending Review Commissioner in August 2014, 
which may facilitate the privatisation of companies owned by 
local authorities9, has been very positive. 
In particular, the Programme for the re-organisation of 
subsidiary companies presented by the Spending Review 
Commissioner which involves a reduction from 8000 to 1000, over 
a three year period, and the improvement of efficiency in order to 
have beneficial effects on public finance and on services offered. 
The strategy of the re-organisation plan is divided into four 
points: a) reduce the scope of the subsidiaries within the area 
corresponding to the institutional goals pursued by the 
authorities10; b) introduce direct constraints on various forms of 
participation; c) enter a series of direct limits on public 
participation and accelerate the closure of non-operative 
Companies; d) favour the exploitation of economies of scale and 
therefore, the aggregation of public service undertakings to the 
network of economic importance in such a way that their 
catchment areas coincide with the Environmental Authorities 
(ATO). 
These measures aimed at the rationalisation of the 
subsidiaries support the improvement of their performance. Thus, 
for example, the proposal to use standard costs in service contracts 
and in benchmarking analysis, or the proposal which enhances 
                                                           
9 See:http://revisionedellaspesa.gov.it/documenti/Programma_partecipate_loc
ali_master_copy.pdf. 
10 It is a provision already provided for in Art. 23, paragraph 27, of the Law 
244/2007, but which, due to the vagueness with which it was made, has not 
found an effective implementation. The reform proposal provides that, the 
decision to maintain the involvement of local authorities in companies 
operating in sectors that are not strictly related to the institutional tasks of the 
authority is subject to screening from the Anti-trust Authority for Competition 
and the Market (AGCM). 
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transparency and greater information for the public as a form of 
control and stimulus for improvement. 
Although the reduction of subsidiaries has been considered 
to be of fundamental importance by the European Commission for 
the purposes of improvement of public finance, in the Update to 
DEF it does not appear among the reforms undertaken on the 
recommendations of the Council of the 26th June, 2014. 
Another fundamental step in the Report of the Commission 
relates to the new strategy of the spending review which is no 
longer based on the linear cuts imposed from above, but founded 
on the indication of expenditure cuts on the part of each Authority. 
In particular, compared to the new method of spending 
review, the Commission believes that if on the one hand it is 
possible to increase the sense of participation and sharing of 
objectives, on the other there is the risk that this method is not 
effective and may compromise the effort to use the savings in 
public expenditure as a tool for economic growth. 
According to the Commission, the uncertainty of the effects 
of the spending review endangers the fulfilment of some measures, 
such as for example, the reduction of the fiscal wedge (labour tax 
cost), which should be largely financed by the savings on 
expenditure. 
On this point, the findings of the Commission lend 
themselves to a dual observation: one relating to a choice of 
method; the other relating to the probability that the risk of not 
being able to finance some measures with the savings derived 
from the spending review materialises. 
With regard to the choice of method, it should be 
considered that in Italy the spending review has always followed 
a centralised top-down approach, in which decisions to reduce 
expenditure were imposed from above, with little contribution 
from public authorities.  
Since Law No. 296/2006 the Ministry of Economy has been 
assigned the task of starting an extraordinary programme of 
analysis and assessment of expenditure, aimed at identifying 
“critical issues, options for the re-allocation of resources, possible 
strategies for improvement of achievable results with available 
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resources, in terms of quality and cost-effectiveness” (Law No. 
296/2006)11. 
Also on the example of other jurisdictions, with Law No. 
196 of 2009 (Art. 39) the experimentation which commenced in 
2007 was institutionalised and then re-launched through the 
actions of the Monti Government, by Legislative Decree 95 of 
201212. 
In particular, the spending review was formally centred on 
the collaboration between the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
and the central authorities. This collaboration takes place within 
Nuclei of analysis and evaluation of expenditure, specifically set 
up with the purpose of monitoring the measures decided in the 
planning phase of the budget, verifying the degree of results 
against the objectives achieved. 
However, in practice, the spending review has almost 
always occurred in a centralised manner. 
An example in this respect was the Legislative Decree No. 
95/2012, enacted into Law No. 135 of the 7th August, 2012, which 
                                                           
11 The programme of analysis and evaluation of expenditure became permanent 
with the Finance Act of 2008 (Law No. 244 of 2007). The programme was 
entrusted to the Technical Commission for Public Finance with the support of 
the State Accounting Office. See the Rapporto intermedio sulla revisione della spesa, 
Rome, December 2007 and La revisione della spesa pubblica. Rapporto 2008, Rome, 
December 2008; Rapporto sulla spesa delle amministrazioni centrali dello Stato, 
Rome, 2009; see G. Pisauro, La valutazione della spesa pubblica, 7 Gior. Dir. Amm. 
684 (2010); a reconstruction of spending review regulatory measures see; G. 
Mazzantini, La lunga strada della spending review, 12 Gior. Dir. Amm. 1163 (2012). 
12 See L. Fiorentino, Oltre la straordinarietà, Il decreto “spending review”, 12 Gior. 
Dir. Amm. 1163 (2012); G. Mazzantini, La lunga strada della spending review, cit. at 
11; M. Macrì, Il nuovo sistema di acquisti di beni e servizi, 12 Gior. Dir. Amm. 1167 
(2012); C. Lacava, Le misure di razionalizzazione: l’organizzazione centrale e periferica 
dello Stato, 12 Gior. Dir. Amm. 1172 (2012); S. Corsi, La spesa nelle autonomie locali, 
12 Gior. Dir. Amm. 1179 (2012); N. Di Vivo, La spesa sanitaria, 12 Gior. Dir. Amm. 
1185 (2012); D. Colaccino, La dismissione e la razionalizzazione di partecipazioni 
societarie dello Stato, 12 Gior. Dir. Amm. 1189 (2012); S. Screpanti, La dismissione e 
la valorizzazione del patrimonio immobiliare pubblico, 12 Gior. Dir. Amm. 1193 
(2012); for a review of Legislative Decree No. 52/2012 see G. Rivosecchi, Gli 
organi e le procedure di controllo, 10 Gior. Dir. Amm. 917 (2012); a comparison 
between the measures adopted by other jurisdictions and the effects of the crisis 
on the government expenditure models has been elaborated by F. Di Mascio 
and A. Natalini, La riduzione della spesa pubblica e la riforma amministrativa, in G. 
Napolitano (ed.), Uscire dalla crisi (2012). 
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operated a spending review on various fronts 13 , but always 
following a logic of linear cuts in expenditure. 
It proved to be an ineffective approach in terms of the 
quality of reduced expenditure. 
The main weakness of the method has been identified in the 
lack of collaboration of the targeted Authorities and protagonists 
over the intervention measures. This lack of collaboration has been 
attributed to the lack of shared objectives established upstream of 
the spending review procedure14. 
In fact, the containment of public expenditure occurred 
primarily through strict financial measures based on algebraic 
calculations, rather than on actual revisions and re-modelling, an 
element which has demotivated and taken away the responsibility 
from those responsible for public expenditure15. 
Simultaneously, the review of second linear cuts produced 
a schism between the objectives pursued by the public authorities 
on the one hand, and those of the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance on the other. First of all, the planned targets are pursued 
through expenditure; secondly, the (reduction of) expenditure is 
the goal to be pursued16.  
                                                           
13 For a review of the provisions introduced by Legislative Decree No. 95/2012, 
enacted into law on the 7th August, 2012, no.135, see M. Macrì, Il nuovo sistema 
di acquisti di beni e servizi, cit. at 11; for a review on measures for staff reduction 
and re-structuring of central and peripheral structures of the State, see C. 
Lacava, Le misure di razionalizzazione:organizzazione statale e periferica dello Stato, 
cit. at 11, 1172; with regard to the interventions expenditure of local entities, S. 
Corsi, La spesa nelle autonomie locali, cit. p.1179; for measures relating to health 
expenditure see N. Di Vivo, La spesa sanitaria, cit. at 11, 1185; the provisions for 
the sale of company shares have been commented on by D. Colaccino, La 
dismissione e al razionalizzazione di partecipazioni societarie dello Stato, cit. at 12, 
1189; the defeasance of public assets are commented on by S. Screpanti, La 
dismissione e la valorizzazione del patrimonio immobiliare pubblico, cit. at 12, 1193. 
14  The importance of shared rules for the attainment of the objective in 
expenditure decisions is brought to light by M. Hallerberg, R. Strauch, J.von 
Hagen, The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union 
countries, Discussion Paper No. 150/2006, www.gesy.uni-mannheim.de 
15  See C. Petrocchi, Il trionfo della burocrazia della cifra, in S. Cassese (ed.), 
L’amministrazione pubblica in Italia (1974); more recently see F. Battini, 
L’amministrazione della spesa, in S. Cassese (ed.), Trattato di diritto amministrativo. 
Diritto amministrativo speciale (2003). 
16 See G. Amato, Dalle regole di copertura al blocco degli impegni, in R. Perez (ed.), 
Le limitazioni amministrative alla spesa (2003). 
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The synthesis of these two opposing views has been sought 
through a change in the methodological approach and in the 
adoption of administrative co-operation in which the Authorities 
involved may be more accountable.  
In this sense, the positive experience of the Japanese system 
and even more so, the Canadian one, in which the role of public 
authorities in the address and in the management of public 
resources was crucial, confirms the validity of shared approaches17. 
This aspect is especially relevant for a system such as the 
Italian one in which the formulation of the budget follows a 
bottom-up procedure where proposals from the Authorities are 
basic.  
An approach based on shared objectives offers the 
possibility of exploiting the revision of public expenditure not 
only for a “State reduction”, but for a re-distribution of its 
resources. 
This re-distribution can occur through a re-organisation of 
structural and administrative procedures aimed at strengthening 
the implementation of the political and financial direction.  
In this way, the expenditure evaluation and review process 
rises from austere accounting to become a tool capable of 
balancing budgetary constraints and re-distribution of resources18. 
In other words, finding a balance between the traditional principle 
of sound performance, which is already in the preceding Art. 97 of 
the Italian Constitution, and the “new” principles of budgetary 
equilibrium and sustainability of public debt.  
More immediate is the observation related to the fact that 
the spending review’s new strategy exposes the Italian 
                                                           
17 See Servizio bilancio del Senato, La spending review nell'esperienza 
internazionale:una breve analisi, no.57/2012; for the Canadian case see. J. Bourgon, 
Program Review: The governemnt of Canada’s experience Eliminating the Deficit, 
1994-1999. A Canadian Case Study, Center for International Governance 
Innovation, www.cigionline.org; J. Ascoli, Canada: Renewal of the Expenditure 
Management System, Strategic Reviews, and Lessons Learned", presentation at the 
77th Annual Meeting of OECD Senior Budget Officials Network on 
Performances and Results, 2011; for the Japanese methodology see H. Tanaka, 
Review of "Program Review", in Japan, Report at the conference "Controlling Public 
Spending in Advanced Economies", 2011, Ministry of the Economy and Finance, 
Rome. 
18 See L. Fiorentino, Oltre la straordinarietà, cit. at 12, 1161. 
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government to the risk of being unable to adopt the reforms 
announced.  
In fact, in this case, the issue is related to the political choice 
of whether to bring about, or not, expenditure cuts suggested in 
the report of the spending review presented in August by 
Commissioner Cottarelli.  
This is, therefore, an inherent choice for the functioning of 
government’s political direction which, although strongly 
influenced by obligations coming from the European Union, 
remains at the national level. 
In the case of Italy, expenditure cuts, contained in the 36 
billion budgetary manoeuvre, amount to 15 billion and have been 
made using a method which is halfway between the shared 
objectives with public authorities and linear cuts imposed from 
above. 
It remains indisputable that the Italian government has had 
to juggle between Scylla and Charybdis: on the one hand, the risk 
of worsening public finances, increasing the risk of EU sanctions; 
on the other, the risk of adopting expenditure cuts, an unpopular 
choice which increases the risk in terms of lower consensus on the 
part of the national electorate.  
How effective this method of semi-linear cuts has been will 
already be known in the first months of 2015 because in March, if 
the announced reforms are not fulfilled or have not given the 
forecast results, the procedure for excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances will come into effect.  
 
 
5 Weaknesses relative to growth in productivity and 
external competitiveness  
A second area of concern for the Commission is related to 
the low growth in productivity which, in Italy’s case, is consistent 
since the nineties and is caused by structural weakness in the 
country.  
Some necessary reforms to alleviate the weaknesses of the 
system, one of which is related to the labour market, were 
highlighted.  
On this point, the Italian Parliament passed an Enabling 
Law on the 3rd December 2014, the so-called Jobs Act, aimed at 
reducing the fragmentation of the labour market, of increasing 
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flexibility in output and creating a new system of social safety 
nets19. 
In particular, the law empowers government to issue within 
six months the decree implementing new labour contracts with 
increased protection, through the establishment of a simplified 
Code of Discipline and the type of contracts, the adoption of new 
services and active labour market policies.  
With regard to the contract with increased protection and 
the re-organisation of the type of contracts, the Enabling Law 
provides that the decrees should consider the coherence between 
the productive system and employment needs. In this perspective, 
by modifying Art. 18 of the Workers’ Statute, the flexibility in 
output has increased by establishing re-integration into the work 
place only in the case of discriminatory or null and void 
dismissals, while for dismissals due to disciplinary reasons the re-
instatement is provided only for specific cases which are still to be 
determined20. 
A new social safety net, Social Security Benefit for 
Employment (ASPI), is anticipated, which will be extended to 
workers with contracts for co-ordinated and continuous 
employment. ASPI beneficiaries should take action to find new 
employment by participating in training or re-training courses. 
The previous social safety net, the Redundancy Fund, will no 
longer be paid in event of termination of business or a branch of it.  
In terms of active labour market policies, a National Agency 
for Employment is anticipated, involving the State, regions and 
autonomous provinces, under the vigilance of the Ministry of 
Labour. The Agency will not carry new burdens on public finance 
and will be responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the 
employment centres in addition to managing ASPI disbursements. 
It is a reform inspired by flexicurity which has already 
inspired labour market interventions on the part of other countries 
in crisis such as Spain where labour market reforms commenced 
                                                           
19 See Senate Act n-148-B. 
20 In Italy, according to Art.18 of the Workers’ Statute, paragraphs 1 and 2, 
dismissal is void when it occurs for the following reasons: marriage; violation of 
the prohibition of dismissal during pregnancy; use of parental leave; illicit 
motive (Art.1345 of the Civil Code). 
NUGNES - COMMISSION’S EVALUATIONS ON ITALY’S IMBALANCES 
 
325 
 
in 2012 (Royal Decree Law 3/2012) and slowly, reduced Spanish 
unemployment to 23.67%, the lowest level since 201121. 
It is likely that, in Italy, the Jobs Act which has just been 
adopted will not be effective in the short-term but in the medium-
term, at least in four years’ time22. 
The effectiveness of the reform, therefore, will greatly 
depend on the method and timing of the implementation of the 
decrees, and the expected presentation of the first Implementation 
Decree to the Cabinet in mid-December 2014 is certainly a positive 
sign.  
The Commission considered that the reform could bring 
important benefits arising from the new logic of active and passive 
employment policies, but it is not certain that this assessment will 
be confirmed in the in-depth study of March 2015.  
Equally positive is the assessment of the measures for the 
reduction of the tax burden which weighs on labour costs with 
disincentivising effects for new investments especially from 
foreign investors. In this sense, further measures have been 
provided for through the Stability Law for the year 2015 which, 
for new contracts with increased protection has provided 
businesses with total decontribution and deductibility of labour 
cost from taxes. 
The effect in the short-term will be a reduction in revenue 
of approximately 4.5 billion which the Italian government believes 
that it should bear in order to try to stimulate employment. 
Even in this case, therefore, it is a path that has just been 
opened, with respect to which the Commission has highlighted 
some risks associated with the late implementation of measures, 
such as the revision of the so-called fiscal expenditure and 
environmental tax. Both interventions are, in fact, aimed at a 
further reduction on employment tax.  
Further observations voiced by the Commission are related 
to the lack of openness in the services market and network 
industries. 
                                                           
21 See Instituto nacional de estadistica, Official data available at www.ine.es. 
22 See C. Pissarides, Labour Market adjustment: microeconomic foundations of short-
run neoclassical and Keynesian dynamics (1976); D.T. Mortensen, C.A Pissarides, 
Job creation and Job destruction in the Theory of Unemployment, 61 Ox. J. Rev. Ec. St. 
397 (1994); more recently see the interview of A.Merli to C.Pissarides, Bene la 
riforma ma i suoi effetti solo in quattro anni, IlSole24Ore, 4th December, 2014. 
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It was particularly noted that the annual law for the market 
and competition, which should have taken the recommendations 
of the Anti-trust Authority for Competition and the Market 
(AGCM) into account, as provided by Law No. 99 of 2009, has 
never been adopted although some measures have been included 
in other laws.  
The Commission has placed particular emphasis on the 
reform of local public services, and especially of local transport, a 
sector which particularly requires the introduction of more 
competition. 
In fact, in local public services, a significant part of the 
market is still run on the basis of direct assignments entrusted to 
entities that do not always respect the necessary requirements of 
in-house providing. In many cases, the award of the service is 
done without notice and often the concession to operate is 
extended for more times.  
The degree of liberalisation of the local public services 
sector is, therefore, still largely insufficient in terms of competition 
for market access. Moreover, even competition within the market is 
almost absent, with some exceptions.  
It is necessary to proceed in the direction of progressive 
regularisation of service concessions that do not comply with 
European regulations.  
In Italy, following an important ruling of the Constitutional 
Court dated 20th July, 2012, no. 199, a new standard for local 
public services was introduced (Art. 34, paragraphs 20 and 21, of 
Legislative Decree No. 179/2012, enacted into Law No. 221/2012), 
which obliged the competent authorities to change those 
management practices that do not comply with the requirements 
of European regulations by the 31st December, 2013 – the deadline 
was then extended to 31st December, 2014 (Legislative Decree No. 
150/2013). By the same date, the Authorities have been obliged to 
publish a report that explains the reasons and the existence of the 
requirements pursuant to the European standards for the chosen 
form of service concession. The same report must include the 
specific contents of the obligations of the public and universal 
service, indicating the economic compensation if required.  
The goal of the standard is to proceed to the 
“regularisation” of award-concessions in full acknowledgement of 
the total autonomy of the competent Authority in relation to the 
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choice of one of the three models of service management: service 
concessions awarded subject to tender; in-house providing; 
public-private partnership.  
However, the effectiveness of the standard was poor to the 
point where the same AGCM highlighted the need to introduce 
instruments to verify compliance on the part of local Authorities. 
In this perspective, the AGCM had proposed the 
introduction of a requirement for local Authorities not to submit a 
report but a determination, that is to say, an administrative act by 
which the official responsible for the entity’s service gives analytical 
reasons that justify the use of the chosen management model and 
highlights the benefits in terms of increased service efficiency resulting 
from this management model. This executive task should also illustrate 
the characteristics and the structure of the markets concerned, the 
operators present and highlight the existence of a benchmark cost for the 
provision of services.  
The need for an intervention aimed at improving 
competition has been highlighted by the Commission, especially 
in the local public transport sector which, in Italy, is characterised 
by an extremely complex regulatory framework. In this regard, a 
first step for the simplification of regulations and adaptation to 
Community legislation could lie in the provision of an Enabling 
Law for Government to strengthen the principle of competitive 
procedure for the award of services or otherwise encourage 
Authorities in the use of tenders for the selection of service 
providers. The Enabling Law could be passed by means of the 
annual bill for competition provided for by Law No. 99/2009, but 
to-date despite the report issued by the AGCM to that effect, a real 
path of reform has not yet been taken up.  
 
 
6 The critical aspects relative to the institutional system 
In general, the report pays particular attention to the 
institutional reform in place but the real weak point remains the 
ability to implement the reforms announced and partly initiated.  
In particular, three types of problems came to be identified. 
A first weakness is identified in the length of the legislative 
process due to our two-house system. 
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In this respect, the start of constitutional reform 23  is 
assessed positively. 
Simultaneously, the legislative fragmentation resulting 
from the break-down of interventions in different legislative 
instruments has been negative. In particular, it was noted that the 
frequent recourse to legislative decrees favours the adoption of 
partial measures at the expense of organic structural reforms. 
The result is a fragmentation and a stratification of 
standards that produce a high uncertainty in the regulatory 
framework, aggravated by delays in the adoption of 
implementation measures.  
A second weakness relates to the overlapping of powers 
between the State and regions which reduces the effectiveness of 
the adopted standards. The problems arising from overlapping 
powers are accentuated by the lack of co-ordination in the division 
of responsibility between central and local public authorities, as 
well as the existence of many administrative rules and procedures 
at the local level.  
According to the European Commission, the institutional 
weaknesses as discussed, should be addressed and resolved as a 
matter of priority to allow the reforms in economic matters to 
manifest their effects24. The European Commission also considers 
that the re-organisation and rationalisation of the powers of the 
provinces, the reform of electoral law and the approval of 
constitutional reform currently under discussion, are useful for 
this purpose.  
In this regard, it should be noted that in August 2014, the 
Senate approved the Bill of Constitutional Reform which 
overcomes the two-house system, reduces the number of Members 
of Parliament, the containment of operating costs of the 
                                                           
23 See the text of the bill of constitutional reform which was approved at the first 
reading of the Senate (AS 1429) and currently before the House (Parliamentary 
Note 2613). 
24 See, World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015 cited by 
the Commission in the Report on Review of Progress on Policy Measures Relevant 
for the Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances, according to which, Italy finds 
itself in the last position in the ranking of 144 countries with regard to 
transparency in policy-making decisions, the weight of public regulation, the 
efficiency of the legal system, favouritism in decisions of public officials and 
public confidence in politicians. 
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institutions, the abolition of the National Council of Economy and 
Labour (CNEL). 
In particular, the constitutional reform provides for a 
differentiated two-house system, in which the House of 
Representatives becomes the exclusive holder of the relationship 
of trust with the Government. It will be the House of 
Representatives who will exercise the function of political, 
legislative and control on the actions of the government.25 
The other House, the Senate of the Republic, becomes a 
second-degree elected body, composed of a maximum number of 
one hundred members. Ninety-five senators are elected, 
proportionately by the regional councils and autonomous 
provinces. No region may have less than two senators. Five 
senators are nominated by the President of the Republic. 
The Senate will also have to assume new tasks, such as: i) 
liaising between the European Union, the State and local entities; 
ii) the evaluation of public authority activities; iii) the verification 
of the implementation of the laws of the State; iv) the monitoring 
and evaluation of public policies; v) the provision of advice on 
Government appointments. 
The legislative function will no longer be exercised equally 
by the two Houses with the exception of a narrow range of 
subjects. For all laws relating to other sectors, the role of the 
Senate is only advisory in nature because the final approval lies in 
the House of Representatives. 
Moreover, in order to speed up the legislative process, a 
fast track for bills presented to Government has been provided for, 
which may request their review and approval within sixty days if 
considered to be essential for the implementation of the 
programme. 
With reference to the overlap between the powers of the 
State and regions, the constitutional reform provides for the 
amendment of Title V of the Italian Constitution in accordance 
with some guidelines which overcome the rigid separation of lists 
of matters referred to in Art.117 Const. 
                                                           
25  Constitutional reform was moved for the first reading in the House in 
December 2014; it is expected that subsequent readings in the Senate and in the 
House will take place by August 2015; the possible referendum and entering 
into force in February 2016. 
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It provides for a system for the division of legislative 
powers which is more flexible, and aspires for greater 
collaboration between State and Regions. The creation of the new 
division of legislative powers should, therefore, eliminate areas 
where there are concurrent legislative powers for the State and 
Regions, re-defining the exclusive powers of both levels of 
government. In order to avoid disputes, a “supremacy clause” has 
been introduced on the basis of the State Law which, on the 
proposal of Government, can intervene on matters or functions 
that are not within the legislative powers of the State, in which 
cases the protection of the legal and economic unity of the 
Republic is required or, in cases where it is necessary for the 
implementation of programmes, or of social-economic reforms 
that are of national interest. 
In this regard, it should be noted that, in view of the long 
time required for the approval of constitutional reform, a 
comprehensive reform relative to local entities was approved 
(Law 56/2014). In particular, the reform which will commence on 
the 1st January, 2015, establishes metropolitan cities that will 
assume many of the powers which to-date were exercised by the 
Provinces, re-organises the Provincial system and encourages the 
union and merger of municipalities. 
In this case also, a part of the reform is entrusted to future 
implementation decrees which shall regulate the functions 
effectively transferred to the metropolitan cities and the 
movement of personnel from one entity to another. 
With specific reference to public administration, the report, 
while acknowledging the efforts put on place by the latest 
measures (in particular, Legislative Decree No. 69 of 2013 and No. 
90 of 2014), maintains that the more ambitious steps may be 
introduced with the bill on the re-organisation of public 
administration currently under discussion in the Senate.  
It is believed that the reform should allow Government to 
re-organise public administration even better, amongst others, 
with reference to the regulation related to public officials and the 
prevention of corruption26. 
                                                           
26 See Senate Act no. 1577 (Re-organisation of Public Authorities) currently 
being examined.  
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The re-organisation bill contains 10 mandates that allow 
Government to issue legislative decrees for implementation within 
12 months from the approval of the law. 
With regard to the re-organisation of the Authorities, 
Government is delegated to adopt legislative decrees for the 
achievement of two key objectives. 
The first concerns the amendment of the structure of central 
offices and those territorial ministries and public entities which 
are not economically feasible in order to render these 
organisations simpler and leaner. This will imply a reduction in 
the Prefectures and a revision of their powers; the role of the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers will be strengthened in the 
analysis and definition of public policies; offices in direct 
collaboration with the Minister will be reduced. 
The second key point in the re-organisation of public 
administration relates to the reform of the structure of the 
Chambers of Commerce Industry Trade and Agriculture, in order 
to define functions and reform the funding system, eliminating the 
current obligatory contribution to businesses. 
With reference to the management assessment, the law 
grants powers to Government to enact legislative decrees 
implementing the reform of general public management, 
including at the regional and local levels, as well as the 
management of the National Health Service. The decrees will, 
among other things, operate a simplified process of assessing the 
activities of officials and establish a connection between 
remuneration and results achieved. 
With regard to anti-corruption measures, the bill in 
question provides that future legislative decrees should integrate 
and strengthen the current regulation already partly integrated by 
the Legislative Decree No. 90/2014 which expanded the tasks of 
the National Anti-Corruption Authority especially in the control 
of public procurement27. 
                                                           
27 The Law of 6th November, 2012, no. 190 had initially given the Commission 
for Assessment, Transparency and Integrity of public authorities the role of 
Anti-Corruption Authority; subsequently with Law 125/2013, converting 
Legislative Decree No. 101/2013, the Commission has assumed the title of 
National Anti-Corruption Authority and for the assessment and transparency 
of public authorities. Lately, Legislative Decree No. 90/2014, enacted into Law 
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It will certainly be taken into consideration that a weakness 
in the Italian system lies in the fact that the effective application of 
new measures is hampered by the inefficiency of the judicial 
system. It is a further area in which Government has already 
partly intervened (Legislative Decrees No. 138 of 2011, No. 69 of 
2013, No. 90 and No. 132 of 2014) and in respect of which, has 
already launched a justice reform, both civil and penal, currently 
under discussion. 
 
 
7. Conclusions. Flexibility in exchange for reliability 
The analysis of the main measures taken by the Italian 
government to comply with the recommendations of the Council 
of June 2013 and the observations of the European Commission in 
November 2014 on the Update to DEF, allow for some reflections. 
Last April, with the DEF 2014, Government decided to 
temporarily waive the adjustment path toward the Medium-Term 
Objective (MTO). The choice was, in fact, motivated by the 
presence of “exceptional circumstances”, identified with a 
distance of -3.7% on the product potential, much higher than the -
2.7% threshold which the European Union considers to be 
representative of recessionary conditions.  
At the same time, Government has reaffirmed its intent of 
not exceeding the limit of nominal deficit of 3% of GDP, the 
threshold originating from the Maastricht Treaty. 
A debt reduction of 2.6% of GDP was expected and 
corrections equal to 0.3% of GDP in 2015 and 2016 have been 
announced. The elimination of the structural deficit has been 
postponed to 2016. 
It was a plan inserted within a path for economic growth 
which provided for a product increment of 0.8% in the current 
year, 1.3% in 2015 and an average of 1.8% in 2016-2018. But these 
projections were not achieved. 
In the 2014 Update, the Italian Government notes the failure 
to start the recovery process: a reduction of 0.3% of GDP and the 
output gap 28  exceeding 4% is provided for, a value which 
                                                                                                                                              
No. 114/2014, has established that the Authority essentially focuses on matters 
of transparency and the prevention of corruption in public authorities. 
28 The output gap is the difference between actual GDP and potential GDP. 
Potential GDP represents the level of gross domestic product compatible with 
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indicates a state of severe recession due also to an unfavourable 
European and international economic climate. 
In fact, the economic situation in the Eurozone has 
worsened over the months. In particular, the principle factor in the 
slow-down seems to be due to a reduction in exports. This trend is 
partly due to a downturn in demand from emerging economies 
and partly to decreases in importation in areas of greater political 
instability. In this sense, a significant impact stems from the fall of 
imports on the part of Russia. 
International political events, such as the crisis in the 
Ukraine, also influence the expectations of businesses. This 
conditioning especially affects German industry which is highly 
integrated with countries from Eastern Europe. 
Another negative element which weighs on national 
economic policy is low inflation in the Eurozone. Deflation might 
seem to be a favourable factor for the European economy in view 
of the reduction in international prices of raw materials. In reality, 
this instead represents a negative condition because it stems from 
the lowering of salary levels caused by high unemployment, the 
low market power of firms and from devaluation in different 
emerging countries.  
In view of this international economic framework, the 
Italian government has aimed to modify its fiscal policy 
highlighting how exceptional events which allow a deviation from 
the path of fiscal consolidation, should not only include the low 
output gap, but also the deflation which causes an increase in the 
interest rates on debt. 
In this perspective, the Update to the Economic and 
Financial Document (DEF) aims to outline an expansive 
manoeuvre to sustain economic growth for 2015 and not to make 
corrections to the dynamics of change in sales throughout 2016. 
It is only in 2017 that the public finance adjustment points 
to a reduction in debt to ensure the structural budget balance. 
It should be considered that the postponement of a 
balanced budget to 2017 requested by the Italian government was 
not simply a derogation from the rules, but was accompanied by a 
                                                                                                                                              
full employment of production factors and with an unemployment rate 
consistent with price stability (Naiwru). See Mef, Glossario di finanza pubblica 
(2013). 
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launch of structural reforms aimed at removing old imbalances 
and boosting growth. 
In fact, the launch of structural reforms is among one of the 
factors which, according to European and Italian regulation, can 
justify a temporary deviation from the adjustment path toward the 
MTO29. 
As previously described, the Italian financial manoeuvre 
has been divided into a series of structural reforms, including the 
reform of the PA, the reform of the labour market, the justice 
reform, some measures for competitiveness which should increase 
growth in the long-term. These reforms, in the Government’s 
planned projections, should have positive effects on the growth of 
the GDP equal to 0.2 percentage points in 2016 and 0.4 percentage 
points in 2017 and 201830. 
In this regard, a twofold uncertainty is noted in face of the 
Commission’s in-depth analysis (In Depth Review – IDR) scheduled 
for March 2015. 
The first is of a political nature and is related to the ability 
of the government and its parliamentary majority to adopt the 
implementing decrees of the different mandates in which the key 
structural reform points are contained. 
On this aspect, the frequent disagreements within the 
government’s political party (DP) and the agreements reached 
with the parties in opposition (Forza Italia) will have a bearing on 
reforms that are of vital importance for the country, first and 
foremost the electoral reform. 
A second consideration is of an economic nature and is 
related to the estimation of the effects on growth and the time in 
which such effects can be achieved. 
In this sense, for example, an element of uncertainty in 
respect to the improvement of public finances relating to the 
interventions on the labour market. As discussed, in fact, one of 
the factors in the Jobs Act is the elimination of contributions paid 
by firms for new contracts of employment. 
                                                           
29 Reg. EC no.1466/97, art.5 “the implementation of major structural reforms which 
generate direct financial benefits in the long-term, including by raising potential 
sustainable grow, and which therefore have a quantifiable sustainability on public 
finances in the long-term”. 
30 See Mef, Nota di aggiornamento al Def, p.18, Tab.II.4 (2014). 
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The provision is designed in this way to stimulate the 
activation of indefinite contracts and reduce labour costs for 
businesses. However, some concerns relate to the difficult 
definition of those who may be the beneficiaries of these 
provisions even in consideration of the new potential employment 
contracts that could come into effect encouraged by the new 
regulation. The consequences on public finances resulting from 
lower income from contributions are, therefore, not ascertainable 
with any degree of certainty31. 
In other words, it is not enough to start structural reforms, 
but it is necessary to carry them through in the shortest time 
possible and, above all, it is necessary for the effects of the 
structural reforms to be assessed in the long-term and not in the 
short-term32. 
At the same time, it is necessary that Europe does not 
follow the route of rigorous orientation “at all costs”, just to 
achieve percentage adjustments of a few decimal places33, but that 
it turns the route around to bet on new paths of growth. The 
possibility that this inversion is achieved depends largely on the 
reliability that governments undergoing strict monitoring for their 
macroeconomic imbalances, are able to demonstrate34. 
In fact, in view of the long lead times for the explanation of 
the effects expected from the reforms, it would be absurd if the 
Commission had to initiate an infringement procedure for 
excessive imbalances due to high debt or low competitiveness of 
the country. A possible initiation of infringement procedure 
would be counter-productive especially in view of the fact that the 
                                                           
3131 See the Parliamentary Budget Office, Rapporto sulla politica di bilancio 2015, 
p.74-75, Rome, November 2014. 
32 On these issues, see the broad analysis of A. Bassanetti, M. Bugamelli, S. 
Momigliano, R. Sabbatini and F.Zollino, The policy response to macroeconomic and 
fiscal imbalances in Italy in the last fifteen years, Banca d’Italia, Fiscal Policy and 
Macroeconomic Imbalances 445 (2014). 
33 The Head of the Eurogroup, J.Dijsselbloem, in the last meeting held on 8th 
December, 2014, highlighted the need for a correction of the structural deficit by 
0.4 percentage points of GDP; in reality, this assessment did not take the further 
correction required by the Stability Law into consideration. See B. Romano, 
Italia, necessarie misure efficaci, IlSole24ore, 9th December, 2014. 
34 See M. Ferrera, Legge di stabilità. Le virtù e i difetti nascosti, Corriere della sera, 
17 ottobre 2014. 
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actual reforms were initiated to represent a guarantee on the 
stability of public finances. 
In the case of Italy, the possibility that the Commission 
concedes greater flexibility in view of exceptional events and 
structural reforms, does not depend so much on assessments of an 
economic nature but also on internal and supranational policy. 
In relation to assessments of internal policy, as already 
discussed, a lot depends on the ability of the political class to work 
cohesively for the common interest. 
With regard to the assessments of supranational policy, the 
European Commission’s delicate position must be considered. 
In fact, the Commission is forced to seek a compromise 
between the application of the rules of the Stability and Growth 
Pact on the one hand, and the political consequences that might 
ensue on the other.  
In such a situation, recession is predictable and opening 
infringement procedures against France for excessive deficits or 
for excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the case of Italy, could 
trigger a political crisis threatening the integration process which 
has already been sorely tried. 
It follows that so long as France remains firm in postponing 
deficit reduction policies to below 3%, Italy can take advantage of 
some flexibility, albeit conditional. 
Moreover, the position taken by France and, though less 
dramatic, by Italy, as opposed to the German one, precisely 
confirms the main weaknesses of fiscal co-ordination applied in 
the absence of political union, or at least, of political co-ordination. 
At the moment, the Eurozone portrays an image where 
each State is holding on to its position. The new European 
economic governance has reinforced procedures and objectives of 
fiscal co-ordination but is proving to be ineffective as a stimulus 
for the adoption of good practice by Member States35. 
In contrast, the strict application of the Pact has produced a 
slow-down in investment, fuelled unemployment and falling 
prices. All contrary effects to the objectives of stability originally 
placed in the same Pact for stability and growth. 
                                                           
35 The doubts on the effectiveness of tax co-ordination also relate to the same 
Macreoeconomic Imbalances Procedure; on this point see D. Gros and A. 
Giovannini, The “Relative” Importance of EMU Macroeconomic Imbalances in the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, Document IAI 14|02 March 2014. 
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Compounding the picture is the loss of the concept of 
solidarity and the absence of a common vision (Tue, art.3, par.3) 
such that the required deficit reduction on the part of some 
countries (France, Italy, Belgium), can be balanced by a reduction 
of the budget surplus through an increase in investment by others 
(Germany). 
In this context, the start of a process toward a political 
union seems more pressing. 
Of course, this will entail reflecting on the contents of the 
political union and its method, community or inter-governmental; 
it will be necessary to revise the Treaties and perhaps, even hold a 
referendum on a European scale. Above all, the reflection must 
consider whether “the Monnet method” of European integration, 
based on a gradual approach through technocratic measures and 
economic integration is still valid. 
